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INTRODUCTION
Courts are, and have always been, teleological in cases involving
litigants with mental disabilities. By "teleological," I refer to outcome-
determinative reasoning; social science that enables judges to satisfy
predetermined positions is privileged, while data that would require
judges to question such ends are rejected.' Courts do this in cases
* Professor Emeritus of Law, New York Law School. Founding Director, International Mental
Disability Law Reform Project, Co-founder, Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates. The
author wishes to thank Heather Ellis Cucolo, Joel Dvoskin, John Monahan, Andrew Ursino,
Naomi Weinstein, David Wexler, and Denis Zavodny for their helpful suggestions. Portions of
this paper were presented to the Biennial Congress of the International Academy of Law and
Mental Health, July 12, 2017, Prague, Czech Republic, and to the annual conference of the
American Society of Criminology, November 18, 2017, Philadelphia, PA
I Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the
Last Frontier?, 20 NYU REv. L. & SOC'L CHANGE 517, 539 (1993-94); see also, David L.
Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 549 (1991) ("Some commentators suggest
that the Court's use of science is disingenuous; these critics believe that the Court cites empirical
research when it fits the Court's particular needs, but eschews it when it does not").
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involving, inter alia, the death penalty,2 the insanity defense,3 civil
competency,4 incompetency to stand trial,5 questions related to
malingering,6 juvenile criminal procedure,7 and criminal sentencing.8
And I am not the only one to have pointed this out.9
Courts are also teleological on the question of admission of
evidence in accordance with the rulings in cases such as Daubert and
Frye.o There is no reason to doubt Professor Susan Rozelle's glum
conclusion that "the game of scientific evidence looks fixed.""1 If
scientific knowledge is, as Professors David Faigman, John Monahan
and Christopher Slobogin have stated, "a product of research that
applies generally to all similarly situated cases,"1 2 then judicial
teleology flies directly in the face of that knowledge.13
2 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The
Puzzling Role of Mitigating Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB.
POL. 239 (1994).
3 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Back to the Past: Why Mental Disability Law Reforms Don't
Reform, 4 CRIM. L. FORUM 403 (1993) (reviewing JOHN Q LA FOND & MARY DURHAM, BACK
TO THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1992)).
4 Perlin, supra note 1.
5 Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1993).
6 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You from Me": The Insanity
Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L.
REv. 1375 (1997).
7 Daniel A. Ross, Rethinking the Road to Gault: Limiting Social Control in the Juvenile
Court, 1957-72, 98 VA. L. REV. 425, 475 (2012).
8 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "I Expected It to Happen/I Knew He'd Lost Control": The
Impact of PTSD on Criminal Sentencing after the Promulgation of DSM-5, UTAH L. REV. 881
(2015).
9 See eg,, Susan Stefan, Silencing the Different Voice: Feminist Theory and Competence, 47
U. MIAMI L. REV. 763, 774 (1993) (courts determine competence "quite blatantly in terms of the
desirability of the outcome"); LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 3, at 156 ("Judges' refusals to
consider the meaning and realities of mental illness cause them to act in what appears, at first
blush, to be contradictory and inconsistent ways, and teleologically, to privilege (where that
privileging serves what they perceive as a socially-beneficial value) and subordinate (where that
subordination serves what they perceive as a similar value) evidence of mental illness").
10 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 586-591 (1993) (crafting a five-
factor test for admissibility of evidence in federal trials); see also Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (designating general acceptance by the scientific community as the
standard for the admissibility of expert testimony).
II Susan Rozelle, Daubert, Schmaubert: Criminal Defendants and the Short End of the
Science Stick, 43 TULSA L. REV. 597, 598 (2007); see also D. Michael Risinger, Navigating
Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L.
REV. 99, 105-08 (2000). In sixty-seven cases of challenged government expertise, the prosecution
prevailed in sixty-one of these. Id. at 105. Out of fifty-four complaints by criminal defendants that
their expertise was improperly excluded, the defendant lost in forty-four of these. Id. at 106.
Contrarily, in civil cases, ninety percent of Daubert appeals were by the defendants, who
prevailed two-thirds of the time. Id. at 108.
12 David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group to Individual (G2i)
Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 424 (2014)
13 There is significant literature available on these issues, but it does not appear as if it has
had any real impact on the judicial process, see e.g., Sally McSwiggan, Bernice Elger & Paul S.
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In a recent article, my colleague Alison Lynch and I discussed
how judges treat biologically-based evidence in criminal cases
involving questions of mental disability law (via privileging and
subordination) so as to conform to the judges' pre-existing positions,
specifically looking at judicial interpretations of neuroimaging
evidence.14We noted that neuroscience, like other types of scientific
evidence, is subject "to the same sort of cognitive dynamics as other
types of scientific evidence." Neuroscience is seen as persuasive when it
is in line with an individual's prior beliefs, but is perceived negatively
when it conflicts with those beliefs.15
In this paper, I will consider what the implications of this behavior
are for criminal procedure developments, and will show how this
behavior violates the basic precepts of therapeutic jurisprudence. First, I
will consider a range of teleological judicial behaviors. Then, I will
consider how biologically-based evidence is especially susceptible to
these sorts of misjudgments, and specifically focus on how these
misjudgments damage the application of constitutional criminal
procedure doctrines. Finally, I will consider how this behavior flies in
the face of the basic tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence.
My title comes from a truly obscure song, Got My Mind Made Up,
that Bob Dylan co-wrote with Tom Petty (and was released on the
rightfully-obscure album, Knocked Out Loaded). It is the final line of
each chorus that needs to be considered in the context of the opening
verse:
Don't ever try to change me,
Appelbaum, The Forensic Use of Behavioral Genetics in Criminal Proceedings: Case of the
MAOA-L Genotype, 50 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 17 92017) (exploring the forensic uses of
behavioral genetic science); Paul Appelbaum & Nicholas Scurich, Impact of Behavioral Genetic
Evidence on the Adjudication of Criminal Behavior, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 91
(2014) (not yet cited in any reported case)..
14 See Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your Mind'": Criminology,
Scientific Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 304 (2016) (Perlin & Lynch,
Wasteland). See also on neuroscience evidence, Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been
Mismanaged with Great Skill": How Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity
Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885 (2009) (Perlin, With Great Skill); Michael L. Perlin,
"And I See Through Your Brain ": Access To Experts, Competency To Consent, And The Impact
OfAntipsychotic Medications In Neuroimaging Cases In The Criminal Trial Process, STANFORD
TECHNOL. L. J. 1 (2009) (Perlin, See Through Your Brain ); Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch,
"My Brain Is So Wired": Neuroimaging's Role in Competency Cases Involving Persons with
Mental Disabilities, 27 BOSTON U. PUB. INT. L. J. 73 (2018) (Perlin & Lynch, Brain Is So
Wired).
On the specific question of the relationship between Daubert and how courts treat expert
testimony as to capacity in guardianship cases and contested-will hearings, see Lawrence A.
Frolik, Science, Common Sense, and the Determination of Mental Capacity, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 41 (1999).
15 Perlin & Lynch, supra note 14, at 343-44 (discussing the research reported in Nicholas
Scurich & Adam Shniderman, The Selective Allure of Neuroscientific Explanations, 9 PLOS ONE
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://joumals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0107529).
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I been in this thing too long.
There's nothin' you can say or do
To make me think I'm wrong.16
As I will discuss subsequently, judges deciding the sorts of cases
that are the subject of this paper are - like Dylan's narrator - equally
impervious to the arguments of others that might suggest that their
conclusions are incorrect, and they show no sign of being receptive to
change. This obduracy - whether in the context of a failed love affair
(as in the song in question)17 - or in the context of criminal law and
procedure decisions involving testimony related to such topics as mental
disability, future dangerousness or the potential impact of neuroscience
evidence leads to dysfunction and dissonance. By writing this paper, I
hope to raise awareness of this dilemma.
I. ON TELEOLOGY
Succinctly, teleology places the highest emphasis on ends, not
means.18 Teleology emphasizes Aristotle's tendency to explain things
primarily with respect to a telos or final end.19 For over 25 years, I have
criticized how courts teleologically weigh social science evidence.20 In
an early piece, I argued that judges are "suspicious of the psychological
sciences," are "hostile to the use of social science in the legal process,"
and, that their track record in this area has, generally, been "dreadful."21
Perhaps courts see social science as a "threat." Perhaps it is feared
that social science's "complexities . . . shake the judge's confidence in
imposed solution, and, perhaps, judges' lack of clarity about the
underlying issues" permits [social science data] to be used as a kind of
deus ex machina, whose sudden appearance produces the desired
16 Bob Dylan & Tom Petty, Got My Mind Made Up, http://bobdylan.com/songs/got-my-
mind-made/.
17 Id. at verses 3 and 4.
18 Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation after Davis, 85 TEX. L. REv. 271, 295
(2006), relying on Robert G. Olson, Teleological Ethics, in 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 88, 88 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
19 Mark C. Modak-Truran, Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue, 12 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 249, 253 (2000).
20 Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common
Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
131, 136-37 (1991). According to Prof. Paul Appelbaum, I actually first made these arguments as
to teleology prior to this, in Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled
Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or Doctrinal
Abyss? 29 ARIZ. L. REv. 1, 71 (1987); see Paul Appelbaum, The Empirical Jurisprudence of the
United States Supreme Court, 13 AM. J. L. & MED. 335, 341 (1987) (referring to the cited article
as putting forth the view that "judicial argumentation is entirely teleologic").
21 Perlin, supra note 5, at 667 n. 210.
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result.22 Nothing that has transpired in the past quarter-century has
changed my mind.
In this same article, I pointed out that other scholars have
suggested that justices of the U.S. Supreme Court employ an outcome-
determinative approach, "uncritically" accepting social science data
bolstering opinions when they are in the majority, but "debunk [ingl" it
when they are in the minority.23 Elsewhere, I have noted that the legal
system selectively-teleologically- either accepts or rejects social
science data depending on whether or not the use of that data meets the
a priori needs of the legal system.24 This teleological turn masks the true
political and ideological bases of judicial decisions.25.
In the context of mental disability law, courts are, as I have
already noted, teleological in their decisions in cases involving the
insanity defense, the death penalty, and criminal and civil
incompetency.26 But courts are also teleological in cases involving, inter
alia, all aspects of the civil commitment proceSS27 and the right to refuse
22 Perlin, supra note 20, at 136. For a pointed example of how judges may be threatened by
the use of social science evidence, see e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1978) (Powell,
J., concurring) (challenging the "wisdom-as well as the necessity-of Justice Blackmun's heavy
reliance on numerology derived from statistical studies" in a jury size case).
23 Perlin, supra note 20, at 137 (quoting Norbert L. Kerr: Social Science and the U.S.
Supreme Court, in THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ON PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 56, 71
(Martin F. Kaplan, ed., 1986)); Cf. Appelbaum, supra note 20, at 341 ("one would like to believe
that the Court's teleology is at least tempered by the evidence before it"). Attorneys representing
individuals with serious mental illness report little, if any, change in the 30 years since Professor
Kerr wrote this book chapter.
Consider here Justice Alito's dissent in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). In Hall, the Court
made it clear that made it clear that inquiries into a defendant's intellectual disability (for
purposes of determining whether he is potentially subject to the death penalty) cannot be limited
to a bare numerical "reading" of an IQ score), noting that Florida's rule was "contrary to all
professional judgment;" see MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 17-4.2.3, at 17-106 (3d ed. 2017). Alito asserted that
the positions of professional associations did not reflect the position of the American people but,
"at best, represent the views of a small professional elite," Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986 (emphasis
added), ignoring the fact that not a single professional association disagreed with the majority's
position.
24 Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the Development of
Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 47, 49 (1993). See also Perlin, supra
note 6, at 1419: "In cases where fact-finders are hostile to social science teachings, such data
often meets with tremendous judicial resistance, evidenced by the courts' expression of their
skepticism about, suspicions of, and hostilities toward such evidence."
For a thoughtful article by a trial judge as to how juvenile courts can better take into account the
science of child development, see Cindy Lederman, From Lab Bench to Court Bench: Using
Science to Inform Decisions in Juvenile Court, CEREBRUM, Sept. 2011, available at
http://dana.org/Cerebrum/Default.aspx?id=39466, discussed in this context in Lynn Hecht
Schafran, Domestic Violence, Developing Brains, and the Lifespan New Knowledge from
Neuroscience, 53 JUDGES' J. 32, 36 n. 28 (Summer 2014).
25 J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and
Psychology, 66 INDIANA L. J. 137, 151 (1990).
26 See supra sources cited notes 2-7.
27 For a classically teleological decision in the area of civil commitment, see the dissenting
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medication.28 Consider here the Supreme Court's decision in
Washington v. Harper,29 providing correctional inmates with a limited
remedy in cases where they have sought to enjoin being involuntarily
medicated: "In providing defendant with a limited remedy, the majority
in Harper selectively chose to privilege those aspects of the data
available on the effects of antipsychotic drugs that discussed the
benefits of such medication, while at the same time acknowledging but
discounting the potential harmful and debilitating effects of these
drugs."30 Interestingly, the Court subsequently did take seriously the
potential harm of these drugs in other cases dealing with other forensic
populations (those who had not been convicted of crimes).31
This teleology is most pointed in cases involving issues related to
mental disability law that reflect judges' overwhelming ambivalence
about all aspects of expert testimony.32 On one hand, judges frantically
desire experts to testify as to future dangerousness (notwithstanding the
experts' plea that they frequently do not have that expertise)33 and to
"take the weight" on difficult release-or-commit decisions.34 On the
option in In re Melton, 565 A.2d 635, 649 (D.C. 1989) (Schwalb, J., dissenting), superseded on
rehearing, 597 A.2d 788 (D.C. 1991) (likening an oncologist's ability to predict the future
prognosis of a cancer patient to a psychiatrist's ability to predict future dangerousness, as
discussed in Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 24, at 55).
28 Id. at 54-58.
29 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
30 Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 24, at 57.
31 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137 (1992) (competent insanity pleader); see also
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 185 (2003) (incompetent defendant awaiting trial). In
comparing Harper and Riggins, I focused on the subordination/privilege issue:
Coming so soon after the decision in Harper, Riggins was somewhat surprising. It
differs importantly from Harper in that the Court treated Harper as a prison security
case while it read Riggins as a fair trial case; yet, this difference in the litigants' legal
status self-evidently has no effect on the physiological or neurological potential impact
of the drugs in question. Nevertheless, the side-effects language in Harper
(subordinated there because of security reasons) is privileged in Riggins (where such
issues are absent) by nature of the Court's consideration of the question in the context
of a fair trial issue.
PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 23, § 8-7.2, at 8-162.
32 See e.g., C. Robert Showalter, Distinguishing Science from Pseudo-Science in Psychiatry:
Expert Testimony in the Post-Daubert Era, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 211, 228 (1995).
33 See e.g., Eugenia T. La Fontaine, A Dangerous Preoccupation with Future Danger: Why
Expert Predictions ofFuture Dangerousness in Capital Cases Are Unconstitutional, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 207, 231 (2002) ("Most psychiatrists do not believe that they are capable of making long-
term predictions of future dangerousness").
34 See e.g., JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981)
(psychiatrists may overpredict dangerousness because of their fear of being perceived as
responsible for the erroneous release of a violent individual). On a question rarely discussed in
the legal process, the likelihood that a person with mental illness may be violently victimized by
another; see John Monahan et al, Violence to Others, Violent Self-Victimization, and Violent
Victimization by Others Among Persons with a Mental Illness, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN
ADVANCE (doi: 10.1 176/appi.ps.201600135) (Feb. 1, 2017). Professor Monahan has more
recently questioned whether biological risk factors for violence would be admissible in court
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other, they characterize psychiatry as "the ultimate wizardry" and refer
to psychiatrists as "medicine m[e]n" or "shamanistic wizards."35 Of
course, the judicial fear of voter retaliation in the case of a "false
negative" decision36 is well known; 37 "the literature is replete with
studies of political campaigns-many of which were successful-that
turned on this precise issue."38
This behavior reflects the heuristic of the "confirmation bias,"
through which we focus on information that confirms our
preconceptions.39 If judges are inclined - for a variety of reasons having
nothing to do with the prevailing law or the substantial valid and
reliable research - to "feel" a position because it "seems right" or is, to
them, "common sense," then, they fit - perhaps consciously, perhaps
,unconsciously - the evidence before them, into their pre-existing
(concluding that it would depend on whether the "rational basis" or "strict scrutiny" test was
employed, but cautioning that such factors cannot be used as a surrogate for race); see John
Monahan, The Inclusion of Biological Risk Factors in Violence Risk Assessments, in
BIOPREDICTION, BIOMARKERS, AND BAD BEHAVIOR: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND ETHICAL
IMPLICATIONS 57,71 (Ilina Singh, Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong, & Julian Savulescu eds. 2014).
On how unconscious bias leads clinicians to overpredict future dangerousness in cases involving
African-American individuals subject to involuntary civil commitment, see Michael L. Perlin &
Heather Ellis Cucolo, "Tolling For the Aching Ones Whose Wounds Cannot Be Nursed": The
Marginalization of Racial Minorities and Women in Institutional Mental Disability Law, 20 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 431, 438 n. 49 (2017), citing Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery,
Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW. & HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 483, 499-501 (2004); James Hicks, Ethnicity, Race, and Forensic Psychiatry: Are We
Color-Blind? 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 21, 23 (2004).
35 Perlin, supra note 20, at 137.
36 "False negatives" refer to persons falsely predicted to be not dangerous. See, e.g., David L.
Faigman, Judges as "Amateur Scientists, " 86 B.U. L. REV. 1207, 1212-14 (2006).
37 See e.g., Samuel Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 417, 464 (2016); LA
FOND & DURHAM, supra note 3, at 156 (discussing how judges privilege expert testimony that
supports their pre-existing positions while subordinating such testimony that rebuts it). On how
judges, in adjudicating sex offender cases, are "as susceptible to heuristics as are all other
citizens," see Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, "They're Planting Stories In the Press":
The Impact of Media Distortions on Sex Offender Law and Policy 3 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 185,
215 (2013). On heuristics, see generally infra notes 38 and 53.
38 MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, SHAMING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
DETRIMENTAL RESULTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR LEGISLATION 165 (2017), citing, inter
alia, Paul Carrington, Public Funding of Judicial Campaigns: The North Carolina Experience
and the Activism of the Supreme Court, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1965, 1989-90 (2011) (discussing the
California Supreme Court election of 1986 that led to the defeat of Chief Justice Rose Bird and
two other associate justices perceived in this way).
39 See generally Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender
Recidivism Through Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community
Integration, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2012) (quoting Eden B. King,
Discrimination in the 21st Century: Are Science and the Law Aligned?, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 54, 58 (2011)). Through this heuristic, people tend to favor "information that confirms their
theory over disconfirming information." Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision
Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1594 (2006). The
essential work on heuristics is JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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schemas of the case in question.40 When the valid research is dissonant
with their "ordinary common sense" on these positions, then that
"ordinary common sense" prevails - an "ordinary common sense" that
is often wrong41-and the research is ignored.42 As Professors Bruce
Green and Ellen Yaroshefsky have noted, these cognitive biases
account for what is popularly known as "'tunnel vision,' the human
tendency to evaluate evidence through the lens of one's preexisting
expectations and conclusions."43
This may also explain a phenomenon I have recently written about
but which appears rarely elsewhere in the literature: How judges
regularly curtail defense lawyers seeking to voir dire proposed expert
witnesses who would be testifying for the state, and similarly curtail
cross-examination of state experts in the case in main.44 An attorney
40 The classic article on the heuristic roots of our systemic misperception of risk is Paul
Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCi. 280 (1987).
41 See e.g., Robert A. Beatty & Mark Fondacaro, The Misjudgment of Criminal
Responsibility,-BEHAV. SCI. & L. - (2017) (forthcoming), manuscript at 13, accessible at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2919855 ("a folk psychology [referring to
"ordinary common sense"] approach to something like mens rea is guaranteed to be wrong some
of the time and costly much of the time").
42 Related to the impact of the confirmation bias in this context is the impact of the hindsight
bias - how we exaggerate how easily we could have predicted an event beforehand. See e.g., Neal
V. Dawson et al., Hindsight Bias: An Impediment to Accurate Probability Estimation in
Clinicopathologic Conferences, 8 MED. DECISION MAKING 259 (1988); Baruch Fischhoff,
Hindsight Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment under Uncertainty, 1 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975); Chris William
Sanchirico, Finding Error, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1189. Judges are no better than lay persons in
avoiding the deleterious impact of hindsight bias. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 826-27 (2001).
The pernicious impact of these biases extends far beyond the areas of law discussed in this paper.
See e.g., Liz McKenzie, Drawing Lines: Addressing Cognitive Bias in Art Appropriation Cases,
20 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 83, 85 (2013) (discussing how fact finders can be improperly influenced
by known cognitive biases such as anchoring, hindsight, and confirmation bias "as well as their
own value judgments" in the area of art misappropriation). See also, Byron Holz, Chaos Worth
Having: Irreducible Complexity and Pragmatic Jurisprudence, 8 MINN. J.L. SCL & TECH. 303,
336 (2007) (discussing how using heuristics to resolve intractable problems "pushes the decision
maker towards value judgments"). On how heuristics lead us to resist changes in our thinking, see
ROBERT A. FORDE, BAD PSYCHOLOGY: How FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY LEFT SCIENCE BEHIND
203 (2018).
43 Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction
Evidence ofInnocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 488 (2009).
44 Michael L. Perlin, "Who Will Judge the Many When the Game is Through? ": Considering
the Profound Differences between Mental Health Courts and "Traditional" Involuntary Civil
Commitment Courts, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. - (2018) (forthcoming) manuscript at 11-12,
accessible at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2860052.
This, of course, is independent from the widely-accepted rule of practice that trial judges retain
wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination when there is a concern about
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness's safety, or interrogation that is
repetitive or only marginally relevant. See e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679
(1986). On issues related to the topics under discussion in this article, see United States v. Giorgi,
840 F.2d 1022, 1038 (1st Cir. 1988) (no abuse of discretion in limiting cross-examination about
alleged mental impairment of witness when witness declared competent to stand trial in prior
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whom I know well who regularly represents persons facing involuntary
civil commitment, and who has requested anonymity, now reports:
"[There are] judges who would give more time to petitioner's side and
less time to us (to the point where I would start timing how long
petitioner's attorney got to ask questions so that I could say my cross
should be allowed to be at least that long)."45
This is especially troubling in subject matter areas in which it is
reasonable to assume that the judges have little pre-existing independent
expertise. By example, judges who, like the rest of us, are subject to an
incessant media barrage of media hysteria on questions of whether sex
offenders are likely to recidivate46 are going to be less inclined to
soberly assess tatistical evidence that rejects this assumption.47 Thus, in
sexual predator cases, forensic psychologists have demonstrated-
beyond doubt-that the actuarial instruments regularly used to
determine who is such a "predator" are fatally flawed.48 Yet, courts
continue to adhere to the principle of "actuarial superiority."49
court-ordered examination).
45 Personal communication to author, October 23, 2016.
46 See generally, Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 37 (discussing this phenomenon).
The US Supreme Court has "bought in" to this myth. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33 (2002)
(quoting the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Nat. Institute of Corrections, A Practitioner's Guide to
Treating the Incarcerated Male Sex Offender xiii (1988) ("[T]he rate of recidivism of treated sex
offenders is fairly consistently estimated to be around 15%," whereas the rate of recidivism of
untreated offenders has been estimated to be as high as 80%."). This 80% figure, however, is
found only once in the literature, in an article written over 30 years ago for a popular psychology
magazine (Robert Freeman-Longo, Changing a Lifetime of Sexual Crime. PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
58. (1986)), and it referred to one counseling program run by the study's author. See Adam
Liptak, Dubious Data Belies Supreme Court's Stance on Repeat-Sex Offenders N.Y. TIMES,
March 6, 2017. The Court's critical errors in mindlessly accepting this figure (for which no
evidence was offered) has not gone without notice. See e.g., Ira Mark Ellman& Tara Ellman,
"Frightening and High ": The Supreme Court's Crucial Mistake about Sex Crime Statistics, 30
CONST. COMMENT. 495, 508 (2015): "([The Supreme Court's] endorsement [of these
unsubstantiated statistics] has transformed random opinions by self-interested nonexperts into
definitive studies offered to justify law and policy, while real studies by real scientists go
unnoticed").
47 See e.g., PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 38, at 73 ("The media-driven panic over sexual
offenders has directly influenced judicial decisions, at both the trial and appellate levels, in this
area of the law, especially in jurisdictions with elected judges').
48 See e.g., John Matthew Fabian, The Risky Business of Conducting Risk Assessments for
Those Already Civilly Committed as Sexually Violent Predators, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81,
85-87 (2005). The difficulty of calculating actual risk using actuarial instruments is compounded
by a host of factors: underreported offenses, amount of time the offenders studied have resided in
the community, and the vast differences in types/attractions/specifics of offending characteristics.
PERLIN & CUCOLO supra note 38, at 97.
49 Eric Janus & Robert Prentky, Sexual Predator Laws: A Two-Decade Retrospective, 21
FED. SENT'G REP. 90, 92 (2008).
For a rare example of a sexual offender case that does not fall into this category, see
Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705-06 (6th Cir. 2016) (Michigan's sex offender registry and
residency restriction law constituted an ex post facto punishment in violation of the constitution),
discussed carefully in Melissa Hamilton, Constitutional Law and the Role Of
Scientific Evidence: The Transformative Potential of Doe v. Snyder, 68 B.C. L. REV. 34 (2017).
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If judges are similarly barraged by anecdotal stories that
"deinstitutionalization is the cause of the criminalization of persons with
mental illness,"5 0 they will be less likely to seriously weight the
impressive accumulation of scientific evidence that rejects this
proposition.51 In such cases, judges - exhibiting such confirmation bias
- are teleological.52 Just as "the hindsight bias ... causes people to hold
decisionmakers legally liable for outcomes that they could not have
predicted,"53 so does the fear of being judged retrospectively to have
been in error - of being second-guessed-abet the confirmation bias.
II. ON BIOLOGICALLY-BASED EVIDENCE
Let us look more carefully now at the way that judicial teleology
corrupts decision-making in cases involving biologically-based
evidence (such as the Harper case previously discussed). Of course, in
virtually all such cases there will be expert testimony presented to the
fact-finder. Theoretically, the task for the expert witness in such cases
"is to communicate . . . scientific knowledge of biologically based
factors to the jury-to use the courtroom as a classroom and to
encourage verdicts based on informed understanding of the facts."54
One of the problems that must be faced is that fact-finders often
reject such evidence because it does not match up with their own
50 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail": Using Therapeutic
Jurisprudence to Remediate the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MICH. ST. U.
J.L. & MED. 343 (2013) (discussing this myth).
51 See id. at 350-53, citing, inter alia, Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Correctional Policy for
Offenders with Mental Illness: Creating a New Paradigm for Recidivism Reduction, 35 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 110, 116 (2011), and John Junginger et al., Effects of Serious Mental Illness and
Substance Abuse on Criminal Offenses, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 879, 879 (2006)).
52 On how confirmation and hindsight bias infect judicial decision-making in the area of
Fourth Amendment law, see Simon Stem, Constructive Knowledge, Probable Cause, and
Administrative Decisionmaking, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1119-1120 (2007) (defining
these two biases, as "cognitive effects that conspire ... to select the facts that ratify the officer's
decision, even if those facts probably would not, and should not, have governed his decision
without the court's aid").
In assessing placement decisions in special education law, courts have recognized the peril of
hindsight bias. See Susan N. v. Wilson School District, 70 F.3d 751, 762 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Courts
must be vigilant to heed Judge Garth's warning that '[n]either the statute nor reason countenance
"Monday Morning Quarterbacking" in evaluating the appropriateness of a child's placement,"'
quoting, in part, Fuhrmann ex rel. Fuhrmann v. E. Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1040
(3d Cir. 1993)), as discussed in Dennis Fan, No Idea What the Future Holds: The Retrospective
Evidence Dilemma, 114 COLUM. L. REv. 1503, 1535 n. 186 (2014).
53 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 571, 588 (1998).
54 Margaret G. Spinelli, Maternal Infanticide Associated with Mental Illness: Prevention and
the Promise ofSaved Lives, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1548, 1552 (2004).
Judges may be especially threatened by social science when it is presented to a jury, as such
presentation may appear to undermine "judicial control" of trial proceedings. Perlin, supra note 2,
at 262.
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heuristic thinking in certain controversial subject matter areas.55 Thus,
in another controversial area of law and society (beyond the scope of
this paper), it is widely believed--despite significant evidence to the
contrary-that race is biologically-based.56
Judicial decisions in this area of the law reflect judges' pre-existing
biases. There is certainly some valid and reliable evidence that
neurobiological evidence has improved the criminal justice system
through better competency determinations and reconsiderations about
the role of punishment in society.57 But then consider how courts
regularly ignore the reality that there is scientific evidence that
instrumental violence may stem from uncontrolled, biologically based
psychopathology (amygdala dysfunction) and/or controlled decision
making that is based on anticipated environmental consequences
(observational and enactive learning of external reinforcers),58 evidence
that is ignored in large part because it appears to conflict with the
primacy of "free will," which is a major underpinning of the entire
criminal justice system.59 Consider further how neuroscience might be
55 "Heuristics" is a cognitive psychology construct that refers to the implicit thinking devices
that individuals use to simplify complex, information-processing tasks, the use of which
frequently leads to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions,and causes decision-makers
to "ignore or misuse items of rationally useful information." See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Are
Courts Competent o Decide Competency Questions? Stripping the Facade from United States v.
Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 957, 966 n.46 (1990), discussing John S. Carroll & John W. Payne,
The Psychology of the Parole Decision Process: A Joint Application of Attribution Theory and
Information-Processing Psychology, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 13, 21 (John S.
Carroll & John W. Payne eds. 1976), and Michael L. Perlin & Naomi Weinstein, "'Said I, But
You Have No Choice"': Why a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client's Decision about Mental
Health Treatment Even if It Is Not What S/he Would Have Chosen, 15 CARDOZO PUBLIC L.,
POL'Y & ETHICS J. 73 (2016-2017).
One single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which
rational choices should be made. Perlin, supra note 6, at 1417. Empirical studies reveal jurors'
susceptibility to the use of these devices. Jonathan Koehler & Daniel Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts:
Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 247, 264-65 (1990). Similarly, legal scholars are notoriously slow to
understand the way that the use of these devices affects the way individuals think. Thomas
Tomlinson, Pattern-Based Memory and the Writing Used to Refresh, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1461,
1461-62 (1995). The use of heuristics "allows us to willfully blind ourselves to the 'gray areas'
of human behavior," Michael L. Perlin, "She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl": Neonaticide, The
Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of Ordinary Common Sense, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 1, 27 (2003), and predisposes "people to beliefs that accord with, or are heavily influenced
by, their prior experiences." Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 37, at 213, quoting Russell Covey,
Criminal Madness: Cultural Iconography and Insanity, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1375, 1381 (2009).
56 Edward Stein, Immutability and Innateness Arguments about Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual
Rights, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597, 619-20 (2014).
57 See Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law: An
Empirical Analysis, 2 J. L. & BIOSCi. 485,508 (2016).
58 Reid Fontaine, Disentangling the Psychology and Law of Instrumental and Reactive
Subtypes ofAggression, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 143, 156 (2007).
59 See generally, Emad H. Atiq, How Folk Beliefs about Free Will Influence Sentencing: A
New Target for the Neuro-Determinist Critics of Criminal Law, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 449
(2013).
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relevant in general if its findings demonstrate that the current criteria for
criminal responsibility are unjust because they do not comport with our
biologically-based understanding of behavior.60
There is a double-edged sword aspect to all of this as well. As John
Puyn has perceptively pointed out:
Neurogenetic evidence risks framing mental illness through a narrow
explanatory model-one relying solely on biological causes. Such
evidence elicits both stigma-reducing and stigma-enhancing implicit
biases against mental illness, which can manifest themselves in
beliefs that a person with mental illness is less blameworthy for his
condition, but also more dangerous and less receptive to treatment.61
But this also "plays into" the pre-existing teleology of judges. An
important example is the fact that, in a vast majority of cases, requests
for funding for neuroimaging test sought by defendants are rejected.62
On the other hand, when the subset of cases involving "shaken baby
syndrome"63 is examined in this context, there is profound prosecutorial
misuse of such testimony, and courts are willing to accept scientifically
questionable testimony offered by the state.64
Recently, with my colleague, Alison J. Lynch, I made this
suggestion in an article about scientific discoveries and the role of
60 Stephen Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic
Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 401 (2006); see also Perlin, With Great Skill, supra note 14, at
912; Perlin & Lynch, My Brain Is So Wired, supra note 14. See , Stephen Morse, Neuroscience
Evidence in Forensic Contexts: Ethical Concerns, in ETHICS DILEMMAS IN FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOLOGY PRACTICE, CHAPTER 9 (Ezra E. H. Griffith ed. 2017)
(forthcoming), accessible at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2923354
(prescribing modesty and caution before employing neuroscience as the basis for expert reports
and testimony in criminal and civil law cases). For a "sober appreciation of [the] limitations and
risks" of neuroimaging, see Russell Poldrack, The Risks of Reading the Brain, 541 NATURE 156
(Jan. 2017), reviewing. Barbara J. SHAKIAN & JULIA GOTTWALD, SEX, LIES, AND BRAIN SCANS:
How FMRI REVEALS WHAT REALLY GOES ON IN OUR MINDS (2017).
61 John Puyn, When Neurogenetics Hurts: Examining the Use of Neuroscience and Genetic
Evidence in Sentencing Decisions Through Implicit Bias, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1019 (2015).
62 See e.g., Lyn M. Gaudet & Gary E. Marchant, Under the Radar: Neuroimaging Evidence
in the Criminal Courtroom, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 577 (2016), Appendix C, available at,
https://drakelawreview.org/vol-64-no-3-2016/.
63 See e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and
the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 1, 1 (2009) ("a medical diagnosis of murder, one
based solely on the presence of a diagnostic triad: retinal bleeding, bleeding in the protective
layer of the brain, and brain swelling").
64 Deborah W. Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 GEO. L.J. 323, 378 (2017)
("Although the criminal law needs neuroscience to help elucidate and refine outmoded
conceptions of mental state, such innovations can come with the baggage of misuse"); See
generally, Deborah W. Denno, How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Differ in Their Use of
Neuroscience Evidence, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2016); Cf. Research in Brief, Shaken Baby
Syndrome and Abusive Head Trauma Accepted as Valid Diagnoses by Most Physicians, 35
CHILD L. PRAC. 123, 123 (Aug. 2016) ("Recent media reports and judicial decisions have called
into question the general acceptance among physicians of shaken baby syndrome and abusive
head trauma").
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criminology in the court process to which I previously referred:
Given the current research available, it is clear that fMRIs, PET
scans, and SPECT scans still have a limited place in our criminal
justice system. However, the law must anticipate and acclimate to the
very real possibility that these technologies will continue to improve
at a rapid rate. This will require a proactive effort on the part of
judges and attorneys to become educated, and to apply Daubert and
Frye tests appropriately-and not teleologically-each time a new
trend in neuroscience emerges. In this way, the legal profession can
also ensure that individuals who already face extreme bias-those
with mental illness-have the chance to present valid and reliable
scientific evidence that may help to mitigate harsh criminal
sentences.65
It is essential that lawyers and judges think more seriously about
these issues in the context of the decision-making outlined in this paper.
III. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 66
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the
past three decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of
therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ).67 herapeutic jurisprudence presents a
new model for assessing the impact of case law and legislation,
recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law that can have
therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.68
Therapeutic jurisprudence asks whether legal rules, procedures,
65 Perlin & Lynch, Wasteland, supra note 14, at 359.
66 Text infra accompanying notes 67-75 is generally adapted from Michael L. Perlin &
Alison J. Lynch, "All His Sexless Patients": Persons with Mental Disabilities and the
Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257 (2014), Perlin & Lynch, Wasteland, supra note
14, and Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 55. Further, it distills the work of the author's over the
past 25 years, beginning with Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence? 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993). See generally, Michael L. Perlin, "Have You Seen Dignity? ": The
Story of the Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 27 U.N.Z. LAW REV. 1135 (2017).
67 See e.g., David B. Wexler, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC
AGENT (1990); David B. Wexler & Bruce J.iWinick, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); Bruce J. Winick, CIVIL
COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005). Wexler first used the term in a
paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in 1987. See David B. Wexler,
Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 27, 27, 32-33 (1992); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Forum: The
Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Theory to Practice, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 691,
693-94 (1999). See generally, David B. Wexler, Mental Health Law and the Seeds of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, in THE ROOTS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 78
(Thomas Grisso & Stanley Brodsky eds., 2018).
68 See Perlin, With Great Skill, supra note 14, at 912; see also Kate Diesfeld & Ian
Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, DISP. & DILEMMAS IN HEALTH
L. 91 (2006) (for a transnational perspective).
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and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic
potential while not subordinating due process principles.69 Professor
David Wexler clearly identifies how the inherent tension inherent in this
inquiry must be resolved: "the law's use of "mental health information
to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon justice
concerns."70 As I have written elsewhere, "An inquiry into therapeutic
outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights
and civil liberties."71
Using TJ, we "look at law as it actually impacts people's lives"72
and assess its influence on emotional life and psychological well-being.
73 One governing TJ principle is that the "law should value
psychological health, strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic
consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values
served by the law, TJ should attempt to bring about healing and
wellness."74 TJ supports an ethic of care.75
The question to be posed here is whether in the instances in which
criminal trial judges consider biologically-based evidence in cases that
involve questions of mental disability law (or choose to not consider it),
to what extent does that decision-making comport with TJ principles?76
Remarkably, there has been almost no scholarship on this specific issue.
Professor Amy Ronner has persuasively argued that one of the
essential values of therapeutic jurisprudence is adherence to what she
69 Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain ": Considering the
Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic
Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481 (2008); Michael L. Perlin, "And My Best Friend,
My Doctor, Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got": The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right
to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 735, 751 (2005) . See also, tan Freckelton,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence,
30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585-86 (2008).
70 David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal
Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCL & L. 17, 21 (1993). See also, e.g., David Wexler, Applying the Law
Therapeutically, 5 APPL. & PREVENT. PSYCHOL. 179 (1996).
71 Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000); Michael L.
Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline": Mental Disability Law, Theory and
Practice, Us and Them, 31 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998).
72 Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing With
Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
73 David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft Spots and
Strategies, PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURIS.: L. AS A HELPING PROF. 45 (2006).
74 Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in
INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003).
75 See e.g., Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in
Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV.
605, 605-07 (2006).
76 On the extent to which criminal sentencing decision-making considers neuroscientific tests
and evidence in the context of TJ, see Perlin & Lynch, Wasteland, supra note 14, at 351-55;
Perlin & Lynch, Brain Is So Wired, supra note 14.
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characterizes as the "three Vs" - voice, validation and voluntariness,77 If
judges decide cases teleologically, then, even if litigants feel they have a
voice in a validated proceeding, it may be a cruel hoax. Litigants
"prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least participating in,
their own decisions,"78 but, if judges ignore valid and reliable evidence,
then this validation may be nothing but an illusion.79
This issue - the accuracy of perceptions of fairness of court
procedures and interpersonal treatment - is rarely discussed, but it
extraordinarily crucial to the subject at hand.80 We know that "people
who feel the legal system, and their own treatment within it, to be fair
will internalize the values of the system, show greater compliance with
court orders, and be less likely to re-offend."81 But, what if that
perception of fairness is an illusion? In an article about the relationship
between law and politics, Professor Charles Geyh has noted, "If, for
example, a judge presents himself as neutral and fair, but is thought to
be under the thumb of an energized legislature or interest group, the
adverse impact on the judge's perceived fairness, honesty, ethics, and
bias seems plain."82 I do not believe that any judicial proceeding can be
"fair" if the judge decides cases in the teleological manner I have
discussed above - even (or perhaps, especially) one being conducted
under the guise of procedural justice and therapeutic jurisprudence
values.83
77 Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 ToURO L. REv. 601, 627 (2008). See also
id.:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or a
chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely
listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of validation.
When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are
more at peace with the outcome.
78 Id.
79 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "They're an Illusion to Me Now": Forensic Ethics, Sanism and
Pretextuality, PSYCHOL., CRIME & L.: BRIDGING THE GAP 239 (2008).
80 See e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Jonathan D. Casper & Bonnie Fisher, Maintaining Allegiance
Toward Political Authorities: The Role ofPrior Attitudes and the Use ofFair Procedure, 33 AM.
J. POL. Sci. 629, 640-41 (1989) (reporting data from interviews with criminal defendants and
concluding that perceptions of procedural fairness affected attitudes towards judicial authority
and government more so than did outcomes and favorable sentences).
81 Carol Fisler, When Research Challenges Policy and Practice: Toward a New
Understanding of Mental Health Courts, 54 JUDGES' J. 8, 12 (2015), citing Tom R. Tyler,
Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 COURT REv. 26 (2007).
82 Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics? 97 CORNELL L.
REv. 191, 241, 277 (2012).
83 See e.g., David B. Wexler, Guiding Court Conversation along Pathways Conductive to
Rehabilitation: Integrating Procedural Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 INT'L J. THER.
JURis. 367, 372 (2016):
While [procedural justice] is of great importance, there are other practices and
techniques-captured by TJ-that are crucially important for judges to employ, and thus TJ
should surely be integrated in court proceedings (specialized or otherwise). This is a dynamic
area and requires ongoing attention to developments in psychology, criminology, and social work
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Many years ago, David Wexler suggested that "sentencing
guidelines and practices . . . be examined from a therapeutic
jurisprudence perspective to shed light on whether they promote or
impede rehabilitation."84 Subsequently, Georgia Zara has thoughtfully
and carefully considered how biologically based criminological research
can be integrated into a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective regarding
the study of the behavior of offenders.85 However, there has been
virtually no follow-up scholarship at all on either of these important
insights.86
Biologically-based evidence is relevant to so much of criminal law,
and virtually all of mental disability law. In trial and pre-trial questions
of competency to stand trial, 87 criminal responsibility,88 competency to
plead guilty,89 and competency to proceed pro se,90 in post-trial
questions of sentencing91 (including mitigation)92 and competency to be
executed,93 and in other mental disability law areas such as whether a
patient meets criteria for commitment,94 the right of patients to sexual
autonomy, 95 the right to refuse treatment,96 and institutional release,97
questions related to brain-biology emerge regularly.98 Therapeutic
and to their integration into the legal system.
84 David B. Wexler, New Directions in Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Breaking the Bounds of
Conventional Mental Health Law Scholarship, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 759, 768 n.35
(1993).
85 Georgia Zara, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as an Integrative Approach to Understanding the
Socio-Psychological Reality of Young Offenders, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 127, 128 (2002).
86 See Perlin & Lynch, Wasteland, supra note 14, at 351-53 (noting this paucity of
scholarship).
87 See, e.g., Perlin & Lynch, Brain Is So Wired, supra note 14.
88 See e.g., Perlin, With Great Skill, supra note 14
89 See e.g., Allen v. Mullin, 368 F. 3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2004).
90 See e.g., State v. McCall, 163 P.3d 378 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).
91 See e.g., Deborah W. Denno, What Real-World Criminal Cases Tell Us about Genetics
Evidence, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1591 (2013).
92 See e.g., Brent Garland & Mark S. Frankel, Considering Convergence: A Policy Dialogue
about Behavioral Genetics, Neuroscience, and Law, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (Spring
2006).
93 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Good and Bad, I Defined These Terms, Quite Clear No Doubt
Somehow": Neuroimaging and Competency to be Executed after Panetti, 28 BEHAV. SC. & L.
621 (2010).
94 See e.g., Nori Wieder, Sealing the Record: An Analysis of Jurisdictional Variations of
Juvenile Sex Offender Record Sealing Laws, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 377 (2014).
95 See e.g., Perlin & Lynch, supra note 65, MICHAEL L. PERLIN & ALISON J. LYNCH,
SEXUALITY, DISABILITY AND THE LAW: BEYOND THE LAST FRONTIER? (2016).
96 See e.g., Douglass Mossman, Unbuckling the "Chemical Straitjacket": The Legal
Significance ofRecent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment ofPsychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1033 (2002).
97 See e.g., Megan S. Wright & Joseph J. Fins, Rehabilitation, Education, and the Integration
of Individuals with Severe Brain Injury into Civil Society: Towards an Expanded Rights Agenda
in Response to New Insights from Translational Neuroethics and Neuroscience, 16 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 233 (2016).
98 There is significant support for the position that "the evidence that many mental illnesses
are biologically based and treatable is stronger today than it ever has been." Sara Nadim, The
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jurisprudence scholars have examined each of these questions
substantively, but have, again, focused virtually no attention on the
topic I am addressing in this paper: the impact of courts' teleological
interpretation of biologically-based evidence.99
Self-evidently, this should be important for multiple reasons. As I
noted previously, there has been virtually no scholarship about the
therapeutic jurisprudence implications of sentencing decision-
making.00 In a recent discussion of this issue - in the context of
defendants with traumatic brain injury (TBI) - Lynch and I underscored
that this was especially distressing for cases involving this population,
"since the recognition of a physical component of their disability could
help to comport with therapeutic jurisprudence principles of dignity,
voice and validation."101 It should be a "given" that the opportunity for
individuals with mental illness and brain injury, "who are already facing
additional discrimination and bias" should have "another avenue
through which to present legitimate evidence." 02 If Courts reject valid
and reliable evidence - because, for example, the defendant does not
"look" brain-damaged - then the proceedings are robbed of any TJ
value.
An instructive parallel can be made here to the way judges
privilege visual cues and clues in insanity defense cases. If a defendant
2008 Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act: An Overview of the New Legislation and
Why an Amendment Should Be Passed to Specifically Define Mental Illness and Substance Use
Disorders, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 297, 318-19 (2009); see also, Christopher John Churchill, The
Parity Cure: Solving Unequal Treatment of Mental Illness Health Insurance through Federal
Legislation, 44 GA. L. REV. 511, 528 n. 126 (2010) (discussing "evidence that mental illnesses
are real, biologically based diseases").
99 On how mental health reform legislation that does not meet the paternalistic needs of
mental health professionals, the statutes are often subverted by expert testimony (and how judges
are complicit in that subversion), see R. Michael Bagby & Leslie Atkinson, The Effects of
Legislative Reform on Civil Commitment Admission Rates: A Critical Analysis, 6 BEHAv. SCL &
L 45, 59 (1988). On how TJ can redeem a heuristics-driven jurisprudence, see Michael L. Perlin,
"They Keep It All Hid": The Ghettoization of Mental Disability Law and Its Implications for
Legal Education, 54 ST. Louis U. L. J. 857, 876 (2010).
100 See Perlin, supra note 8.
101 Perlin & Lynch, Wasteland, supra note 14, at 354. For the only legal scholarship about the
relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence and traumatic brain injury, see Evan R. Seamone,
Dismantling America's Largest Sleeper Cell: The Imperative to Treat, Rather Than Merely
Punish, Active Duty Offenders with PTSD Prior to Discharge from the Armed Forces, 37 NOVA
L. REV. 479 (2013). 1 am currently working with Lynch on a paper exploring this precise
question. See Alison J. Lynch & Michael L. Perlin, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model of
Representing Criminal Defendants with Traumatic Brain Injury (work in progress; originally
presented to the American Society of Criminology, November 2016, New Orleans, LA). On the
determination of PTSD and neuroscientific research, see Mark B. Hammer, The Role ofPTSD in
Adjudicating Violent Crimes, 42 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 155 (2014). On how patients with TBI are
often treated inappropriately in state facilities, see Williams v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591,
618 (D. Md. 2001) ("Dr. Culotta testified that the chaotic environments in the state hospitals
subjected the plaintiffs to an unacceptable risk of harm because they were inappropriately
managed for TBI patients").
102 Perlin & Lynch, Wasteland, supra note 14, at 354-55.
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does not "look crazy,"1 03 then the legitimacy of an insanity defense is
rejected.104 The fact that most persons with severe mental illness do not
comport with popular culture's depictions of "crazy people"1os increases
the likelihood of teleological decision-making and diminishes the
likelihood of TJ-based decision-making.106
If judges continue to teleologically privilege certain evidence and
subordinate other evidence107 - and this is the heart of the problem -
then the accuracy of Professor Susan Rozelle's pessimistic observation
that "the game of scientific evidence looks fixed" 08 is inevitable. And
such a "fixed" game flies, again, in the face of the basic principles of
therapeutic jurisprudence. If courts discount biologically-based
evidence because such evidence does not coincide with the judges' pre-
existing positions, then the core TJ principle of "validation" is absent.
This "fixed" game also robs persons before the court of their "voice,"
and it mocks the notion that it is "voluntary," that, per Ronner, the
"litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive."10 9
The relationship between the hindsight bias and therapeutic
jurisprudence was first tackled nearly thirty years ago in a therapeutic
jurisprudence "forerunner" article by Wexler and Professor Robert
Schopp,I10 in which they suggested trial bifurcation as a potential way
103 See e.g., Perlin, supra note 2, at 265-66 ("the lay public cannot, by using its intuitive
'common sense' effectively determine who is or is not criminally responsible by whether or not
the individual 'looks crazy').
104 See Michael L. Perlin, "Merchants and Thieves, Hungry for Power": Prosecutorial
Misconduct and Passive Judicial Complicity in Death Penalty Trials of Defendants with Mental
Disabilities, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1501, 1532 n. 132 (2016):
Whether or not a defendant "drools" has acquired totemic significance in these sorts of
cases. In the trial of Andrew Goldstein for the murder of Kendra Webdale (after whom New
York's outpatient commitment statute, "Kendra's Law," was named), jurors, who initially
rejected Goldstein's insanity defense, "reported crediting testimony that Goldstein did not froth at
the mouth or drool, and considered his lack of drooling significant to their responsibility
determination." See Amanda Pustilnik, Prisons of the Mind: Social Value and Economic
Inefficiency in the Criminal Justice Response to Mental Illness, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
217, 248 (2005).
105 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 724 (1989-90): "To the lay person (the
juror or the judge), the temporarily delirious patient 'leaping over chairs and taking the
broomstick to hallucinatory monsters' [still] looks more genuinely psychotic than a deeply
disordered but calm and brittle-worded schizophrenic," citing Walter Bromberg & Harvey
Cleckley, The Medico-Legal Dilemma: A Suggested Solution, 42 J. CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY
729, 738 (1952).
106 On juror response to evidence of physical brain "abnormalities" in insanity cases, see
Richard Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the
Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51 (2006).
107 See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 3, at 156.
108 Rozelle, supra note 11, at 598.
109 Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. IEv. 89, 94-95 (2002).
110 See David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight
Bias in Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAv. SCL &
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of alleviating the harm that this bias could cause in some malpractice
litigation,"II and suggested the adoption of a "hindsight bias quotient" to
be employed in jury selection in such cases.112 Importantly, in this work,
the authors take note of the possible detrimental effect that jurors'
verdicts based on infallible hindsight can have on physicians' treatment
decisions made without the benefit of hindsight.113
The parallels to judicial decision-making in the cases I have been
discussing are striking. Professor Nigel Stobbs has argued that the
teleological world view can be used as a "backboard against which to
highlight the emotive views of the more trenchant critics of therapeutic
jurisprudence,"' 14, and I think Professor Stobbs has it exactly right. I
have written in the past that "we need to take what we learn from
therapeutic jurisprudence to strip away sanist behavior, pretextual
reasoning and teleological decision making from the insanity defense
process.""15 I have written this article in an effort to re-focus on
therapeutic jurisprudence as a means of combatting teleology in the law.
What can be done? First, judges must "own up" to what they do.116
There are no new revelations here. I first wrote about this in 199 1; 17 La
Fond and Durham's book was published in 1993;118 Rozelle's article
was published in 2007. The response from the judiciary has been, to a
great extent, deafeningly silent.119 I have written often about the
L 485 (1989), reprinted in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 135 (David B. Wexler &
Bruce J. Winick eds. 1991).
111 Id. at 147. See also Edward A. Dauer, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective on Legal
Responses to Medical Error, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 37, 39 (2003) ("[I]n a very patent way, the tort
system is ineradicably infected with 'hindsight bias"').
112 Wexler & Schopp, supra note 109, at 155.
113 Id. at 151-52.
114 Nigel Stobbs, In Defence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Threat, Promise and Worldview, 8
ARIZ. SUMMIT L. REV. 325, 349 (2015).
115 Perlin, With Great Skill, supra note 14, at 913; see also, Perlin, supra note 6, at 1425-26.
Sanism is an irrational prejudice based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition and
deindividualization, see e.g., Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism, " 46 SMU L. REV. 373 (1992).
[Piretextuality refers to the ways that courts often accept testimonial dishonesty and engage in
dishonest decisionmaking, see, e.g., Perlin, supra note 5. On how Therapeutic jurisprudence
"might be a redemptive tool in efforts to combat sanism, as a means of 'strip[ping] bare the law's
sanist fagade," see Michael L. Perlin, "Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun": The
International Human Rights and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications ofJuvenile Punishment
Schemes, 46 TEXAS TECH L. REv. 301, 331 n. 185 (2013).
116 Although there is a robust literature (much of it written by judges) on how judges can
employ therapeutic jurisprudence principles in their work, see e.g., Michael King, A Judicial
Officer Assists Offenders to Set Rehabilitation Goals & Strategies, in THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE MAINSTREAM (blog), accessible at
https://mainstreamtj.wordpress.com/2017/02/28/a-judicial-officer-assists-offenders-to-set-
rehabilitation-goals-strategies-tj-court-craft-series-8/ (Feb. 28. 2017) (King was formerly a judge
in Australia), this does not seem to have had a significant impact on the judiciary as a whole).
17 See Perlin, supra note 20.
118 See LA FOND & DURHAM, supra note 3.
119 But see Michael S. King, Geraldton Alternative Sentencing Regime: Applying Therapeutic
and Holistic Jurisprudence in the Bush, 26 CRIM. L.J. 260 (2002).
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pernicious impact of false, self-referential "ordinary common sense" in
judicial decision-making;120 nowhere is it more toxic than here. Next,
lawyers must be vigilant about seeking their own independent expert
testimony in cases involving biological evidence. In Ake v.
Oklahoma,121 the Supreme Court found a constitutional right to an
independent expert in cases where defendant makes a showing that his
or her sanity at the time of the crime is going to be a significant issue at
the trial. Courts have been reluctant to expand the scope of Ake
significantly in subsequent years in such areas as neuroimaging tests122
or assessment of intellectual disability in death penalty cases.123
Especially given the "fixed-ness" of the "game," it is essential that
defense lawyers seek a vigorous expansion of this doctrine.124
In such cases, there may be need for two experts: one to evaluate
the litigant and offer a clinical assessment, and one to explain to the
fact-finders why they must step outside of the "comfort zone" of their
"ordinary common sense," and reject the ease of heuristic thinking, so
as to judge a case accurately, especially in cases involving the sort of
biologically-based evidence that is so susceptible to teleological
thinking. There is certainly precedent that urges the admission of what
Professor John Monahan and his colleagues have referred to as "social
frameworks testimony" so as to allow for "the introduction of general
social science research to frame or provide context for the determination
of specific factual issues in litigation," a gambit that has met with
"widespread agreement."1 25 But, to my knowledge, there is no evidence
120 "[O]rdinary common sense" is a "'prereflective attitude' exemplified by the attitude of
'What I know is "self-evident"; it is "what everybody knows."' Keri K. Gould & Michael L.
Perlin, "Johnny's in the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine": Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Clinical Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339, 357 (2000) (citing Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects
and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729,
737 (1988)). See generally, Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 39; Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics
and the Insanity Defense: Ordinary Common Sense and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3
(1990), reprinted in LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE BROADENING OF THE DISCIPLINE 109 (James
Ogloffed. 1992).
121 470 U.S. 68, 83-84 (1985).
122 See e.g., Perlin, See Through Your Brain, supra note 14, at 22.
123 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Life Is in Mirrors, Death Disappears ": Giving Life to Atkins,
33 N. MEX. L. REV. 315, 332 (2003).
124 In McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017), the Supreme Court elaborated upon the
Ake standard, finding that the expert witness must "help ... the defense evaluate the [assigned
doctor's] report [and defendant's] medical records and translate these data into a legal strategy,"
id. at 1800. See generally, PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 23, § 15-4.4, at 15-72 to 15-76,
discussing McWilliams.
125 John Monahan; Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender
Discrimination: The Ascendance of "Social Frameworks", 94 VA. L. REV. 1715,, 1727 (2008).
See also Id. at 1742 (footnotes omitted):
[W]e believe it appropriate for a judge to exercise her power to comment on evidence to
suggest how social framework evidence may apply to the case at hand, and for appellate courts to
then review this commentary to set limits on the proper uses of framework evidence and to ensure
uniformity of use across cases. In this way, a common law of social frameworks may develop
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that this sort of testimony has been proffered in cases such as the ones
to which I refer here.
This issue raises other TJ-related issues for the defense appellate
lawyer. In a slightly different context, David Wexler has looked at the
dilemma she faces in many cases:
The appellate lawyer's task is a highly sensitive one. On the one
hand, it is important for counsel to convey the message of voice and
validation. On the other hand, it is crucial that counsel not simply serve
as an apologist for an appellate affirmance; that appellant know that
counsel is truly on the appellant's side, giving the case the best possible
shot.126
This important insight of Wexler's needs to be considered in the
context of what I have raised in this paper. If the fact-finder employs
this sort of teleology to make baseless findings, because, based on
heuristic reasoning, those findings are consonant with his "ordinary
common sense, then what is the obligation of the defense lawyer in
explaining why and how a decision was made for baseless reasons? I
have written elsewhere about the role of the defense counsel when faced
with prosecutorial misconduct in death penalty cases involving
defendants with serious mental and/or intellectual disabilities,127 but
these issues require a different sort of approach on counsel's part.
Certainly, the refusal to allow an expert witness to testify as to the bases
of judicial teleology can be raised as grounds for appeal. Though it is
not likely that these grounds will be speedily granted, 128 nonetheless, I
think counsel must begin to take this issue seriously.
In a series of earlier articles, I have suggested ialogues that a TJ
practitioner might have with her client in cases involving the
incompetency status and the insanity defense, sex offender law, and
criminal sentencing.129 Writing about relapse prevention planning,
analogous to the common set of judicial instructions on social frameworks that we envisioned in
our original proposal.
126 David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer, in REHABILITATING LAWYERS: PRINCIPLES OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
FOR CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE 20, 39 (David B. Wexler ed. 2008).
127 See Perlin, supra note 103; Michael L. Perlin, "Your Corrupt Ways Had Finally Made You
Blind": Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Use of "Ethnic Adjustments" in Death Penalty Cases
of Defendants with Intellectual Disabilities, 65 AM. U. L. REv. 1437 (2016); Michael L. Perlin,
"Power and Greed and the Corruptible Seed": Mental Disability, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and
the Death Penalty, 43 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 266 (2015).
128 Given the penury of courts in granting applications to extend Ake to other areas of
substantive biological evidence, see Perlin, See Through Your Brain, supra note 14, at 21 ("The
courts have generally read Ake narrowly, and have refused to require appointment of an expert
unless it is 'absolutely essential to the defense,"' citing STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J.
CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 802 (6th ed. 2000) , I am not optimistic that this will
be an easy job for defense counsel).
129 For examples of conversations for clients raising the insanity defense or the incompetency
to stand trial status, see Michael L. Perlin, "Too Stubborn to Ever Be Governed by Enforced
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Wexler has suggested additional TJ-compliant questions that an
attorney might ask.130 A thorny question to be asked here is whether, in
a conversation of this sort, should counsel share with her client the fact
that the judge's decision may not be based on a fair assessment of the
facts and law, but on the judge's pre-existing teleological "reading" of
the matter in question - that the apparent fairness is, in fact, an
illusion?'31 To return to Bob Dylan again, think of the sardonic lyric in
The Lonesome Death of Hattie Carroll:132 "In the courtroom of honor,
the judge pounded his gavel/To show that all's equal and that the courts
are on the level."1 33
We know that some judges have suppressed evidence in negligence
cases that would have, if admitted, exacerbated the impact of the
hindsight bias on a jury's judgment.134 That reality tells us that, in one
related area, courts have grasped the potential negative impact of
heuristic thinking on judicial decision-making, at least when it comes to
potential juror bias.135 But this still does not go to the question of bias
on the part of judges.
Recall that therapeutic jurisprudence is designed to let us "look at
law as it actually impacts people's lives"l 36 and to bring focus on the
law's influence on emotional life and psychological well-being.137 The
teleology of the judicial process in this context makes it impossible for
these aims to be met. It is time for this to change. Articulating the
existence of this teleology and amassing legal and other policy-based
Insanity": Some Therapeutic Jurisprudence Dilemmas in the Representation of Criminal
Defendants in Incompetency and Insanity Cases, 33 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 475, 480-81
(2010). For criminal defendants prior to sentencing, see Perlin, supra note 7, at 924-25. For
individuals facing sexually violent predator commitments, see Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L.
Perlin, Promoting Dignity and Preventing Shame and Humiliation by Improving the Quality and
Education ofAttorneys in Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Civil Commitment Cases, 28 FLA. J. L.
& PUB. POL'Y 291 (2017).
130 Wexler, supra note 83, at 370-71.
131 See Kimberly A. Kaiser & Kristy Holtfreter, An Integrated Theory of Specialized Court
Programs Using Procedural Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Promote Offender
Compliance and Rehabilitation, 43 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 43, 51 (2016): "Although there has
been substantial theoretical discussion regarding the role of legitimacy and compliance with the
law, there has been a relative lack of empirical research testing this relationship."
132 Carroll, an African-American hotel worker, was killed by William Zantzinger, a wealthy
tobacco farmer who received a six-month sentence after the initial charge of murder was reduced
to manslaughter. See Michael L. Perlin, Tangled Up in Law: The Jurisprudence ofBob Dylan, 38
FORD. URB. L.J. 1395, 1404-05 (2011).
133 http://bobdylan.com/songs/lonesome-death-hattie-carroll/. See CHRISTOPHER RICKS,
DYLAN'S VISIONS OF SIN 221 (2003), concluding that Hattie Carroll "brings home the falsity of
the boast . .. that 'the courts are on the level."'
134 See Rachlinski, supra note 53, at 617.
135 On the heuristic roots ofjuror bias in general, see John E. Montgomery, Cognitive Biases
and Heuristics in Tort Litigation: A Proposal to Limit Their Effects without Changing the World,
85 NEB. L. REV. 15 (2006).
136 Winick, supra note 72, at 535.
137 Wexler, supra note 73, at 55.
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arguments against its perpetuation will go a long way towards fulfilling
therapeutic jurisprudence mandates.
CONCLUSION
Judges decide cases teleologically, taking refuge - perhaps
unconsciously - in time-worn heuristics that appeal to their own
distorted "ordinary common sense."I38 This is especially problematical
in cases involving biologically-based evidence since so much of this
evidence is out of the ken of lay persons.139 Such cases demand "a
proactive effort on the part of judges and attorneys to become
educated,"l40 an effort that it does not appear to me is being made.141 1
believe that a turn to therapeutic jurisprudence in this contextl42 would
best remediate this state of affairs. TJ demands an "ethic of care";143
even if judges profess to be deciding cases in line with procedural
justice values, if they fall prey to teleological thinking, that "ethic of
care" cannot be present.
The narrator of Bob Dylan's song that gave this article the first part
of its title had "his mind made up." That might or might not have had an
influence on the ultimate resolution of the love affair that is the subject
of that song. But when judges approach cases with their "mind[s] made
up," this certainly does influence the resolution on the cases before
them, often leading to a decision that cannot be supported by the facts
or the valid and reliable research evidence. It is time that we begin to
take this state of affairs far more seriously than we ever have.
138 See generally, Perlin, supra note 20. On how teleology is "inspired" by alleged common
sense, see Bert van Roermund, The Embryo and its Rights: Technology and Teleology, 14
GERMAN L.J. 1939, 1947 (2013). See also Perlin, supra note 6, at 1425-26 ("we accept an
insanity defense system that is sanist, pretextual and teleological, a system that rests on the shaky
underpinnings of heuristic reasoning and a false OCS (ordinary common sense").
139 See generally, Richard S. Schmechel et al, Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors' Understanding
ofEyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177 (2006).
140 Perlin & Lynch, Wasteland, supra note 1'4, at 359.
141 See generally, cases discussed in sources cited supra notes 53-64.
142 A turn suggested by Wexler and Schopp nearly 30 years ago. See Wexler & Schopp, supra
note 110.
143 Winick & Wexler, supra note 75, at 605-07.
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